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1942

**BRITISH EMBASSY, BAGDAD.**

FO 624/29

No.: 380.

Name of File:—

Saudi Arabia - Iraq:

RELATIONS.

(No minutes to be written here.)

LAST Year's File No.: 522.

NEXT Year's File No.: 639.



Saudi - Iraq Relations 380/10/42.

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR,  
'IRAQ.

SECRET.

العراق

وزارة الداخلية

Baghdad the 24th June 1942

P.S.No. 810



Copies to:  
F.O. P.L. 176  
M. of S. P.L. 19  
Jedda P.L. 6  
Beirut P.L. 7  
Jerusalem ) with  
C.I.C.I. ) comps.  
dated 1 July, '42

*Archives*  
*Please issue copies as indicated in margin*  
*by the Ambassador*

On 22 June Shukri Beg Kuwwatli and Asad Beg, Saudi

Chargé d'Affaires, came to see me by appointment. They said that King Abdul Aziz had been so impressed by your advice, reported by Asad Beg, that the Arab Governments should drop all their minor squabbles and concentrate on larger issues, that he had now instructed his Legation not to pursue the current correspondence and exchanges regarding the vexed boundary and Shammar questions, and to concentrate on obtaining satisfaction in a number of cases of thefts of camels and the like for the Saudi complainants, many of whom had appealed to the King personally. Asad Beg handed me the list, explaining that they had already given a copy to the Minister of the Interior, who had promised to have the cases followed up vigorously.

I said that I too would do my best, and the same morning urged the Minister to respond to the gesture by making a real effort to get each case investigated and settled one way or another by methods which satisfy bedouin ideas of the fair administration of justice. Salih Beg said that he had already given instructions to this effect; but, since he had little or no knowledge of the recent history of the friction between the two States, he had not perhaps realized, before I emphasized it, that the request was combined with a definite gesture of moderation.

Shukri Beg went on to say that he hoped that, for the duration of the war, the Iraqi Government would acquiesce in the view that the places named in the description of the boundary were to be shared; after all Ibn Saud was in possession of Judaidat al 'Arar (wadhi' al yadd), but he would have no objection to posting there of Iraqi police also.

In case he had not had the Iraqi point of view put clearly before him I took the opportunity of summarizing for him both the Iraqi and the Saudi thesis regarding the interpretation of the tre-

*Ch...*  
*with this*  
*old*  
*me*  
*circulation*  
*in*  
*24/6*  
*to suggest*  
*copies to*  
*C.I.C.I.*  
*M. of S.*  
*Stamps*  
*Jedda*  
*F.O.*  
*Permutation*  
*30/6*



of Muhammara and the Protocol of Ugair, and pointed out that the difference, though at first sight a wide one of principle, in practical application really narrowed down to the ownership of the shallow wells of Judaiddat al 'Arar, the question regarding Muqur being a rather different category; a serious difference of principle could only be settled by Arbitration, though if it were realised how trivial the actual material difference turned out to be, it should not be difficult to settle by compromise. I recalled the constant friction between the Anglo-Iraqi authorities and the French over the Syrian boundary, and though no doubt each side had had some complaint about the decision of the Commission, any chagrin at the loss of some little enclave here or there had long ago been forgotten, and the peace that had ensued was recognized as cheap at the price.

Shukri Beg said that King Abdul Aziz was unalterably opposed to Arbitration (he seemed to suggest that this was because if he lost his rights in Judaiddat al 'Arar his officials would have no place to water), but would be glad of a compromise obtained through the friendly intervention of a third party such as His Majesty's Government.

My own view (which of course I did not mention) is that a satisfactory compromise could easily be achieved on the basis of the acceptance of the Saudi thesis regarding Judaiddat al 'Arar in return for Saudi agreement to recognize Muqur al Na'am as the Muqur of the Protocol.

*Gave ending,*

*P. J. Brown*

H. E. Sir Kinahan Cornwallis,  
K.C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O.,  
H.B.M.'s Ambassador,  
Baghdad.



Saudi - Iraq Relations

380/9/42.

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR,  
IRAQ.

Baghdad the 18th June 1942

P.S.No. 779.



المراق  
وزارة الداخلية

Dear Holo,

Thanks for your 380/8/42 of 15.6.42.

How easy & simple it is for British spectators from afar to attribute tribal movements to "political mismanagement by the Iraqi Government". In 99% of such cases the reason is grazing requirements. The P.A. may have heard echoes of Muhammad al Turki's disgrantlement at the Ministry's confirmation of the award of the arbitrators in the Lussuf wells dispute. Another spectator nearer home had been suggesting that the Government had been guilty of mismanagement because it did not give the award in favour of Mahrut sooner, without certain precaution to make the solution water-tight (see my P.S.748 of 22.12.41 to Embassy & to Col.Aston). The P.A.Kuwait names Amir ibn Mijlad as leader of the dissidents; this Shaikh is now in Baghdad seeking a restoration of his ma'ash.

The spectators are difficult to please.

Yours sincerely,

P. I. Ennassir

Captain V.Holt, C.M.G., M.V.O.

H. Holt

No action

2 1/2 weeks but  
2 1/2 weeks is 2 weeks  
work while passing  
in to Kuwait? VA 24/6





Saudi Arabia - Iraq: Relations

380/8/42

Copies to:

x Lt.Col.E.K.Wood.

x Lt.Col.C.C.Aston, O.B.E.

15th June, 1942.

(380/8/42)

x Secy 11/6 R


Allen Richards

I enclose herein an extract

from Kuwait Intelligence Summary

PARA 179 } No. 10 of 1942 dated May 16th -

31st.

  
(SGND) V. HOLT

VH  
JB  
RK

  
C.J. Edmonds Esq., C.M.G., C.B.E.,

17/6.  
xpb. to see a. a.  
copy 11/7/42

INDEX



Extract from Kuwait Intelligence Summary for the period  
from the 16th to 31st May, 1942. No.10 of 1942.

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LOCAL INTERESTS.

179. It is reported that the powerful tribal group of the Dahamsha, a sect of the great Anizah tribe inhabiting the Syrian desert, under their Amir Ibn Mijlad, have obtained Bin Saud's permission to migrate south from the Syrian desert and Iraq, and take up their summer quarters on the Hafar al Batin wells. There are so many of them that Ibn Saud has instructed any overflow who cannot water their camels at the above wells, to proceed to the Suman and camp on the Safa and other wells. Two things may have caused this migration south:-

(a) the difficulty of obtaining supplies from the Euphrates cities of Iraq, or,

'b) political mismanagement of the tribes affairs by the Iraq Government.

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No. 33  
(289/11/42)

British Embassy,  
Bagdad.

9th June, 1942.

Sir,

I ~~am~~ directed by His Majesty's Ambassador to transmit to you, herewith, copy of a note-verbale addressed to the American Legation about publicity for the Wheeler Mission, *W.L.C.*  
~~2. I am to~~ request that you will pass a copy of the enclosure to the Mission in question.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

~~Secretary~~

W.L.C. Knight Esq.,  
His Majesty's Consul-General,  
BASRA.



Cypher.

From H.M. Minister  
Riyadh.

To  
Foreign Office,  
London.

20.00hrs. 28/2/42.

19. Tour.

February 28th., 1942.

Addressed to Foreign Office No.19 of February 28th.,  
Minister of State No.14, Bagdad No.5.

My telegram No.9.

I felt that one advantage of sending de Gaury in advance was that Ibn Saud could let off steam about Iraqi Government against whom he had three main grievances:

1. Detention of diplomatic bag about which he was doubly enraged as it contained wedding present which had to be delivered after ceremony.

2. Unreasonable attitude of Iraqi Government in matter of transport of pilgrims. Not only had Iraqi Government not thanked him for employing his transport to rescue pilgrims brought to pilgrimage in inadequate vehicles but they had blamed him for state of his roads and tried to cast on him responsibility for getting pilgrims back safely to Iraq.

3. Recognition of Syrian independence. Ibn Saud could not see what right Nuri had to write an official protest because he had followed His Majesty's Government's lead without consulting Nuri. If His Majesty King George sent a telegram of congratulation that was enough for him without seeking Nuri's advice.

2. Ibn Saud spoke with considerable bitterness to de Gaury on these subjects but when time came for him to discuss them with me he had received a propitiatory telegram from Nuri (outcome I gathered of latter's talk with Choucri Kuwatli) containing apology for bag incident but with barest reference to Syrian independence. This point rankles for Ibn Saud feels that Nuri's action is dictated not by any principle but by a desire to pose as a better judge of what is in Arab interests than Ibn Saud and better placed to take a line independent of His Majesty's Government.

3. Passing to earlier differences Ibn Saud had only old solution to offer. As regards Shammar there were only two solutions they should return to him or be removed from the frontier. There should be a neutral zone in which both parties should share responsibility for police patrol.

INDEX



H.E. *W*  
*16.3*

Pages have been written about these two questions - the demarcation of the Saudi-Iraqi frontier and the Shammar of Najd in Iraq - and an attempt to summarise them briefly runs the risk of being misleading.

The following are the main points:

The Frontier Demarcation.

The Iraqi Government has made a sincere effort to have this done fairly. Points of dispute have inevitably arisen (they were bound to with a frontier described loosely from a small scale map) and in 1940 the Iraqi Government proposed that very full powers should be given to a neutral arbitrator (chosen by the Government of Egypt) to settle these points impartially on the ground with the aid of Saudi and Iraqi technical commissions. The Saudi Government refused this proposal. The proposals now made by Ibn Saud through Shukri Quwatli are obviously jejune and offer no prospect of progress.

As a man of experience in affairs Shukri Quwatli should surely see this and appreciate the advantage to both sides of adopting the Iraqi Government's proposals for neutral arbitration after consideration of the arguments of both side. (The Edmonds draft of the Iraqi proposal is at 86/30/40. His notes on the frontier are at 86/37/40).

It would, I think, be undertaking too much to enter into discussions with Shukri Quwatli about the main points in dispute covering Judaidat al Ar'ar and Muqur, but it might be pointed out to him that recent friction

about

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.



about Judaiddat al Ar'ar arose not from any action taken by the Iraqi Government but because last May the Saudis established an armed post on the wells there and the Iraqi Government objected. The incident is not therefore a Saudi but an Iraqi grievance.

The Shammar of Najd.

In April 1940 Nuri Pasha visited Ibn Saud at Raudhat al <sup>TANNA</sup> ~~Tauka~~ and concluded an Under-standing which provided inter alia that the Iraqi Government should send back to Najd all Shammar Najd tribesmen who had entered Iraq during the preceding five years. (see Appendix I at 547/16/41). This undertaking was loyally carried out and was completed by the Autumn of 1940.

By June 1941 many of them had however found their way back into Iraq and the Saudis began to demand that they should be expelled again.

The Iraqi view is that the Saudis should have prevented these Shammar~~s~~ from leaving Najd: the Saudi view is that the Iraqis should have stopped them from entering Iraq (the Saudis have some right on their side - see last ~~part~~ of paragraph 2 (a) of the Under~~standing~~ but as Mr. Edmonds points out in his note at 547/15/41 it is not common-sense that the Iraqis should be expected to line the frontiers with police to prevent the Shammar~~s~~ from coming back).

The new proposals sent through Shukri Quwatli ask for the expulsion of any Saudis who

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.



who come into Iraq (or rather this seems to be their meaning as they are very badly drafted). This would be quite impossible in the open desert.

The only thing to do seems to be to turn out the Shammas once more on the clear understanding that in future it will be up to the Saudi Government to keep them from going back to Iraq again.

This would be a better plan in my opinion than taking them north of the Euphrates, for they would certainly ~~for they would certainly~~ find their way back into the Southern desert area sooner or later and then the fat would be in the fire once more.

PH

16.3.42.

I have been unable to  
reach Mr Edwards

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.



Bagdad, 12th March, 1942.

Your Excellency,

A.C.,

With reference to my conversation with Your Excellency, as desired by Your Excellency I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy each of the solutions suggested by His Majesty King Abdul Aziz al Sa'ud for the settlement of the frontier and tribal problems outstanding between Iraq and the Kingdom of Sa'udi Arabia.

Please accept my highest respect.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) Shukri al Quwatli.

His Excellency  
Sir Kinahan Cornwallis,  
His Majesty's Ambassador,  
Bagdad.

~~INDEX~~



Riyadh, 15/2/1361

(2nd March, 1942).

Frontier Problem: It is not hid from any of those who have studied this case of delimitation that the frontier was determined against the wishes of Najd under pressure by the British Government. Abdullah al Damaluji is aware of this fact. The Treaty of Muhammerah lays down that the Shammār grazing grounds and watering places shall belong to us, while the Dhafir grazing grounds and watering places shall belong to Iraq. In the Uqair Protocol, however, we were given none of the Shammār grazing grounds and watering places. These were all included in the territories of Iraq, while some of the Dhafir watering places were declared "neutral" (sic. ? Common to both parties - Translator). This goes to show clearly that compulsion was exercised against us and that we were not fairly treated in the Protocol.

We have no desire whatever to take away one single square foot of territory from Iraq, or to press hard upon the latter or to raise any dispute with her. God forbid that we should entertain any such desire. A "discussion" (sic) of the provisions of the Treaty is, however, necessary in the interest of the frontier. Without such discussion life in that locality would be impossible. Our frontier contiguous with Judaidat 'Arar and Maqwar contains no other grazing grounds and no other watering places to meet the needs of our tribes and patrol parties. We cannot agree to arbitration, as proposed, over a matter provided for in the Treaty and one without which we cannot do, for we cannot agree to suffer harm through our Iraqi kinsmen and neighbours. We, however, agree to one of two solutions as in the following proposition :

A joint body representing Iraq and ourselves, accompanied by (survey) engineers, to go out and undertake an inspection on the spot. If it is found (by such body) that what we claim involves harm for or interference with Iraq, then our claim shall be declared vain; and if, on the other hand, what we claim is found necessary and indispensable for us and our tribes, then our Iraqi kinsmen must act fairly by us, since, like us, they are anxious for a settlement of the difference and the removal of harm. In the latter case, to ward off harm, safeguard the interests of our neighbours and remove causes of misunderstanding, the localities in question shall be declared common territory for the use of both parties.



Riyadh, 15/2/1361  
(2nd March, 1942).

Shammar Question: On this, we agree to nothing except what is provided for in the earlier and subsequent treaties and agreements. This is our right, and we owe it to our subjects that we should insist on it. We, on our part, do not allow ourselves to interfere in the affairs of their subjects. The view we take, on which we insist, is that old undertakings must be implemented. By these we mean, firstly, the Treaty of Muhammerah, and, secondly, the treaties signed by Nuri al Said at Mecca and the last one signed by him at Raudhat al Tanha. If our kinsmen of Iraq complain that it would be somewhat hard upon them to expel desert bedouins, we would suggest the following :-

The Iraqi Government to undertake to expel from Iraq any of our subjects entering Iraqi territory without our will and without authority in writing from us, as provided for in the Agreement signed at "Al Tanha", or to remove such subjects to a place away from the frontier, beyond the Euphrates, and also to undertake that any tribe or individual or group of individuals who, having been removed to beyond the Euphrates, re-enter any of the localities to which entry had been prohibited shall be arrested by the Iraqi Government and forcibly removed into Najd. Action under this undertaking to be explained thus: With a view to settling the dispute between the two governments, His Majesty King Abdul Aziz suggested the foregoing and the Iraqi Government accepted his suggestion and gave an undertaking accordingly.

"Secondly" (sic. ! accordingly - Translator) no person having entered this zone, which is outside the frontiers of Najd, or localities entry into which by such tribe etc. has been declared harmful, may go out into Najd unless provided with a letter of introduction from the Iraqi Government stating that he is going out for a certain specified purpose, for fear lest persons should infiltrate for robbery and pillage while professing to be out for some other purpose. This to be done on the principle of reciprocity.



بغداد ١٢ اذار ١٩٤٤

صاحب الفخامة

بعد التحية والاحترام -

عطفاً على حديثي مع فخامتكم وبناءً على غيتكم اشرف بتقديم صورة عدد كل من الحلول

التي يراها صاحبة حفرة صاحب الجلالة الملك عبد العزيز آل سعود لتسوية قضايا الحدود ولقضاء  
التي ما برحت معلقة بين العراق والمملكة العربية السعودية . وتفضلوا بقول فائق الاحترام

المخلص

سار القوي

What is the  
me

13-3

حفرة صاحب الفخامة السركن فان كورنواليس سفير بريطانيا العظمى المحترم

بغداد



مسألة الحدود - ليس يخاف على احد من درسوا تاريخ هذا التحديد ان الحدود عمت بالرغم من نجد وكان بناء على ضغط الحكومة البريطانية وعبد الله الدملوجي يعلم ذلك ومعااهدة المحمرة نصت على ان تكون موارد شمر لنا وموارد الظفير لهم ولكن في بروتوكول العقير لم يعط لنا شئ من موارد شمر بل كلها دخلت في اراضي العراق وبعض مياه الظفير جعلت محايدة وهذا دليل واضح على اجبارنا وعدم الانصاف في البروتوكول.

انه ليس لنا اى رغبة في اخذ شبر من العراق او تضيق على العراق او ايجاد خلاف بيننا وبينهم حاشا وانما البحث فيما نرعى في المعاهدة وهو امر ضرورى على الحدود لا يمكن الحياة في ذلك المكان بدون ذلك فحدودنا المناخمة لجدة عرعر ومقرر خالية من الموارد والمياه التي تحتاجها رعايانا ودورياتنا وليس لها مورد غيرها وطلب التحكيم في امر منصوص عليه في المعاهدة وليس لنا بد منه فهذا شئ لا نقره لاننا لا نقبل الضرر على انفسنا من اخواننا وجيراننا المراقبيين بل نقبل احد الامرين المذكورين ادناه - فاما ان تخرج هيئة مستقاة من العراق ومن عندنا ومعهم مهندسون ينظرون في الموقع فان كان ما قلناه فيه ضرر على العراق او تحرش فهذا باطل وان كان ما طلبناه هو امر ضرورى لا بد منه لنا ولرعايانا فيجب الانصاف من اخواننا المراقبيين. فان اخواننا المراقبيون يرون مثل رأينا حسما للخلاف ودفعاً للمضرة فتكون المحلات المذكورة بيننا وبينهم تستعمل من الطرفين دفعا للمضرة عنا مع المحافظة على مصالح جيراننا وازالة لسوء التفاهم.



الرياض في ١٥ / ٢ / ١٣٦١

مسألة شمر - لا نقبل فيها الا ما نصت عليه المعاهدات والاتفاقيات السابقة واللاحقة  
لان هذا حق من حقوقنا في رعايانا ونحن لا نسمح لانفسنا التداخل في امر رعاياهم ونحن رايننا  
والذي نلح عليه هو تتميم ما كان اولها معاهدة المحمرة وثانيها ما كان من المعاهدات التي امضاها  
نوري السعيد في مكة وآخر ذلك ما وقع في روضة التنهات . فاذا كان اخواننا العراقيون  
يشلون بعض المشقة التي تنالهم من اخراج البادية فنحن نرى انه اذا تعهدت حكومة العراق  
ان تخرج من العراق كل من يدخل من رعايانا الى اراضيها بغير رضائنا ولا امر خطي من طرفنا  
لما نص عليه في اتفاقية التنهات والا تبعده الى محل بعيد عن الحدود وراء الفرات وتتعهد بان -  
القبيلة او الانفجار او الشخص الذي يرحلون الى ما وراء الفرات اذا نزل في المنازل التي منع  
من النزول فيها فالحكومة العراقية تقبض عليه وتدخله بالجبر الى نجد وذلك بان يقال -  
بانه نظرا في حسم الخلاف بين الحكومتين فان جلالة الملك عبد العزيز قد ارتأى ما تقدم  
وان الحكومة العراقية قبلت والتزمت بذلك . وثانيا ان جميع من دخل هذه المنطقة الخارجة عن  
حدود نجد والاطراف التي تقرر ضرر نزولهم فيها انه لا يخرج منهم احد الى نجد حتى يكون معه  
تعريف من حكومة العراق ان هذا الشخص خرج للسبب المعلن مخافة تسريبهم للسلب والنهب بحجة  
ان لهم اغراضا والمثل بالمثل .



He

of Y.E. as thinking  
of taking any part in  
these discussions I suggest  
it would be well to  
have a talk with Mr  
Edmonds first.

He has studied both  
questions in detail

OS. 11/4/3

I suppose S.Q. will talk with him tomorrow. As I shall not  
be doing N.E. tomorrow when he can be brief me shortly.  
Give me your views on the proposals. Do this as I remember N.E.  
thinks the Sherman should be returned and some other more only  
with the books to the U.S. on the other. Perhaps he has recorded  
his views.

15.7



RADIO NEWS SUMMARY

11-3-42

Berlin (News in Arabic)  
7.30 to 8.00 P.M.

(R)

25 Meters

A Communique issued by the German High Command states that all enemy attacks in the central, Northern and Southern sectors of the Eastern front were repelled. The enemy lost heavy casualties as a result of these operations. The 76th German Division showed great ability all during the fights, and battles.

In North Africa the enemy was obliged to retreat back losing heavy casualties. German planes successfully attacked the enemy's positions and military objectives near Al Makkelli in North Africa. German planes also attacked Britain and Malta. Aerodromes and harbours were directly hit.

In the waters surrounding Jutland the enemy lost yesterday one trade ship of 2000 tons. The British Air Force lost between the 1st. of this month and 9th 68 planes, while we lost only 19 planes.

Enemy planes carried out several raids on Germany dropping several bombs on the houses and hospitals. The enemy lost in these operations three planes. First Lieutenant Cafanise showed great courage and ability during the late battles in the Eastern front.

The British Intelligence Police caught several Arabs in Damascus and Aleppo and put them in prison. They were accused of joining anti British Societies.

The Former Russian Ambassador in Turkey arrived Palestine to establish a Soviet Embassy there.

The British House of Commons has decided to send Stafford Cripps to India. This is a sure proof that the situation in India is very critical.

The British Director of Posts and Telegrams announced that all of the parcels letters and other things sent to Turkey Bahren Iraq and other Near Eastern countries were damaged. This proves that the German ships and submarines are dominating the Seas.

2 British planes crashed near Gibraltar, one of the crew was saved.

Reports recieved from Spain states that a great number of British Naval units arrived Gibraltar to under go repair. Among them was the aircraft carrier Herpe and a destroyer a cruiser and a submarine. Gibraltar is now called by most of the people the hospital of the British ships.

Several schools were established in the Ukraine by the Germans. The teachers are pure Ukrainians before they were Jews.

The British Radio announced that we hope that Russia wins this war because we are afraid of Germany lest it attack Britain. We have all confidence in the Russian soldiers but no confidence in our own selves or soldiers the announcer added.

The German submarines sunk yesterday 4 enemy ships totalling 27 000 tons. A British war prisoner declared that at the time of the British occupation of Berqa I was imprisoned by them, not I only the prisoner declared but also the doctor of Benghazi, and the head of the Berqa hospital, my wife and my children



Saudi-Iraq. 380/5/42

also at 73/24/42, 143/19/42.

Foreign Office, London

1st March, 1942

235

22.55 hrs.

Addressed to FOREIGN OFFICE, No. 235 IMPORTANT

Reputed to Minister of State No. 55 IMPORTANT

Jedda, No. 24

Spears Mission No. 36

Jerusalem, No. 36

India, No. 80.

Nuri has informed me that Shukri Quwatli has returned to Riyadh taking a private letter of apology from him concerning the incident of the diplomatic bag and assuring Ibn Saud of Iraq's friendship. This is in reply to an angry letter from Ibn Saud. Nuri added that Shukri Quwatli had strongly approved a declaration of war by Ibn Saud and Iraq and had said that on his return to Syria he intended to persuade the National Bloc to work to the same end. He is, according to Nuri, convinced that any association with the Axis would be disastrous to Syria. He is due back in Baghdad on March 5th and will presumably return to Syria a day or so later.

CORNWALLIS.





Most Secret &  
Personal.

19th February 1942.

Ref:-D0/H/34.



Dear *H-16*

Although Ibn Saud's distrust of Nuri and the Iraq Government is well known to you, I thought the above may be of interest at this stage of Iraqi - Saudi relations.

Captain V. Holt. C.M.G., M.V.O.  
British Embassy  
Baghdad.

**y/purs**

No further action

✓ 257

# INDEX



Saudi-Iraq Relations. 380/3/42

COPY OF TELEGRAM.

PARAP  
Direct

From H.M. AMBASSADOR,  
BAGDAD.

To H.M. Minister, Jedda.

Date 11th February, 1942

No. 19

Time despatched 12.50 hrs.

Addressed to JEDDA No. 19

Repeated to Foreign Office, No. 146  
Minister of State, No. 30.

My telegram No. 18.

Saudi Charge d'Affaires informed me this morning that bag had been delivered to him and that in reporting this to his government he had recommended that the incident should be regarded as closed.

CORNWALLIS.

VH  
RD  
JM  
RK

-121-



He <sup>W<sub>1</sub> 2</sup>

The Sauch & A telephone  
this morning that the  
value has been delivered

W<sub>1</sub> 2  
J. J. J.  
70  
M. J. J.

the legation. He thanks

Y & for your intervention

on telegraphing to his

Govt. recommending

that the incident should

be regarded as closed.

177 <sup>177</sup> 2



to the European continent. Diamonds bought at a low price and sold at a high price in Europe, this action pleased the Jews very much and they began to bring enormous quantities of this material. When Britain heard of that she in her turn sent representatives to America, and in this way America was dominated by the Jews first and second by the British.

Now 2 powers existed in this Newfound place the Jews on one side and the British on the other. So the Jews planned a revolution against their masters, and the revolution took place and the British were kicked out of America, and the Jewish influence replaced the British, and this influence remains till now.

During the time of the revolution the Jews showed great enthusiasm, as if they love the Americans or America itself, but the reality is that they love America's gold.

In the year 1850 the Jews in America numbered only 50,000, in the year 1865 they numbered 150,000 and now they number millions and millions. So from this time the Jews made America their National home, and whenever a conflict takes place in the whole world or in one part of it, the Jews ask the American Govt. to interfere and give righteousness to the Jews and to them alone. This incident took place at the time of the murder of Padri Thomas which story I have told you. That was when the Jews killed the above mentioned Padri and told the American Govt. to interfere in the matter and ask the Sultan not to arrest the assassins (who were Jews).

Their last activities is when they sent Roosevelt messenger to the Near East Mr. Pollet. In the year 1859 they opened a school by the name of BOARDS OF EDUCATION OF THE ISRAELITES, whose object was to spread Jewish Propaganda between AMERICANS.

In the year 1863 they tried to occupy the Moslem and Arab State Morocco in the same way they occupied America and dominated it. But their plans did not succeed, and Ibrahim Pash did not permit that.

In the year 1901, and 1902 a revolution took place in Rumania, because the Jews expelled the Rumanian Peasant from the fields and replaced. This action made the Rumanian Peasant very poor and without anything to eat. That was the purpose of the revolution taking place in Rumania. The Jews at that time told the American Govt. about this incident and the American Govt. in her turn sent a memorandum to the Rumanian Govt. At that Time Theodore Roosevelt was the President of the American Republic.

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Saudi-Iraq Relations. 380/2/42

**COPY OF TELEGRAM.**

From H.M. AMBASSADOR,  
BAGDAD.

To H.M. MINISTER, JEDDA.

PARAP

Date 10th February, 1942.

No. 18

Time despatched 10.2. 1605. ✓

Addressed to JEDDA No. 18.

Rptd. Foreign Office No. 140 direct  
Minister of State No. 29

Your telegram No. 19.

Facts appear to be that about January 26th Saudi Arabian courier brought to Iraq two bags of which one was not officially sealed. He stated that seal had dropped off but Basra Customs official nevertheless detained it. Undue delay occurred in reporting matter to Bagdad and there has been further delay in sending the bag here. M.F.A. has promised Saudi Arabian Charge d'Affaires that it will be delivered to him on arrival.

Incident which should never have occurred was due in first place to ineptitude of minor officials and not to any ill will on part of Central Government. Prime Minister only heard about it on February 8th. I have impressed both on Prime Minister and M.F.A. the importance, especially at the present time, of avoiding such incidents and of satisfactorily settling this one. I feel sure they do not want trouble but Ibn Saud's habit of assuming that their intentions are of the worst does not help matters. Will you please assure him that I have seen no indications of ill will on the part of the Government here.

CORNWALLIS.

380/1/42 }  
O.S. after desp.

KC  
CB/GDM  
JB  
AA

Yel

Q



Ken

1<sup>st</sup> Sanchez G d A  
tells me that 1<sup>st</sup>  
Minister for P A has  
promised to have the  
valise sent up at  
me & delivered to  
1<sup>st</sup> Sanchez Legation.

L.P. has not yet arrived  
The M.P.A. says that  
1<sup>st</sup> is because 1<sup>st</sup> train  
has been delayed.

I will enquire again  
on Thursday?  $\frac{10}{12}$

Please enquire tomorrow am. & ask if I  
can do anything to help. We must provide  
him for developing.

me  
10.2

Ted



Translation.

Urgent.

No. 106/2/44.

Dated, 7th February, 1942.

The Arab Sa'udi Legation, Bagdad, presents its compliments to the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, in continuation of its note No. 106/2/19 dated 19th Muharram, ~~XXXXXX~~ 1361 (29th January, 1942), has the honour to state that it is now 12 days since the diplomatic bag belonging to the Legation was confiscated by the Basra customs and that the bag was confiscated notwithstanding the fact that the person who carried it was furnished with an official document certifying that he is charged with the carriage of diplomatic mails for the Legation. The Legation are still ignorant of the fate of the confiscated bag.

From enquiries since made by it from the diplomatic courier, the Legation finds as follows :-

1. The courier noticed that the lead seal had fallen off the bag only after he had entered the customs office and after the customs official, one Abdul Rahman al Mani', had proceeded carefully to examine the two bags, which he roughly handled and turned about in an attempt to ascertain their contents.
2. The official, Abdul Rahman al Mani', declined to act on the suggestion of the courier that he should seal the bag, off which it was observed the seal had fallen, and insisted that the bag should be opened for him to ascertain the contents of the case inside it. His insistence to this end having proved of no avail, he led the courier by the hand into an adjoining room and there tried to induce the latter to disclose to him, privately, the nature of the contents of the case within the bag, and also enquired from him about the contents of the other bag and why it looked so big.
3. The Basra customs authorities confiscated the bag, which had been brought round from the Zubair Customs office by the official Abdul Rahman al Mani', failed to seal it, declined to give an official receipt for it, and, notwithstanding the time lapsed since its confiscation, have failed to send it on to Bagdad or to the Legation as they had given the courier to understand ~~that~~ they would do. All that the courier was able to obtain, after strong insistence, was a slip of paper, signed by a customs mamur of Basra and dated 27/1/42, in which the mamur certifies having received a locked case belonging to the Arab Sa'udi Legation, Bagdad, in the course of carriage by a Sa'udi diplomatic courier. The slip is enclosed herewith.

The Legation regards this treatment derogatory to the honour of its Government and contrary to international rules of procedure, as the bag in question was confiscated from a person having the character of official diplomatic courier. If the Iraqi authorities had any suspicion, they could have reported the matter to the Legation instead of resorting to such treatment as the above. In the meantime, the continued holding up of the bag notwithstanding the fact that the Legation had immediately reported the incident to the esteemed Ministry, both verbally and in writing, calls for astonishment indeed.

The Legation ~~are~~ constrained strongly to protest to the esteemed Ministry against this irregular treatment and to inform the Ministry that unless the case is promptly handed over to the Legation and an assurance is given that the incident will not be repeated and the official responsible for it will be punished, measures as necessary will be taken for the immediate

He is  
This is  
the paper  
about  
which I  
spoke to  
J.E. this  
morning  
7/2

O.S.  
M.A. promised me  
yesterday he will  
put this case  
27th to day -  
Can you please  
ask Asad Bey  
whether he has  
done so  
see  
8.2



*the service*  
suspension of, mails between the two countries.

The Legation avails itself of the opportunity to express its highest consideration and esteem.

The Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs,  
Bagdad.



٤٧٠ / ١٠٦  
١٣٦١ / ١ / ٢١  
١٩٤٢ / ٢ / ٧

مستعمل

مستعمل

تهدي المفوضية المصرية السودانية بحياتها الى وزارة الخارجية المصرية  
والحاقا بمذكرة هذه المفوضية رقم ١٠٦ / ٢ / ١٩ تاريخ ١٢ / ١ / ١٣٦١ الموافق ٢٩ /  
١ / ١٩٤٢ تتشرف بافادتها بأنه قد مضى اثنا عشر يوما على مصادرة جمرك البصرة للكيس  
البريد السياسي العائد لهذه المفوضية وذلك بالرغم من كون الشخص الذي يحمله كان  
مزودا بوثيقة رسمية تثبت صفته وتشهد بأنه مكلف بنقل البريد السياسي الى هذه المفوضية  
ولا تزال المفوضية تجهل الآن صير الكيس المذكور .

لقد اتضح للمفوضية من التحقيق الذي اجريته فيما بعد مع حامل البريد السياسي  
ما يأتي .

١- انه لم يلاحظ سقوط رصاصة الكيس الا بعد دخوله الى الجمرك وهذا اخذ  
الموظف المدعو عبد الرحمن الطاع بفحص الكيسين اللذين يحملان اسم المفوضية بكل وضوح  
وقلبهما بكل خشونة محاولا صرفة محتوياتهما .

٢- ان الموظف المذكور عبد الرحمن الطاع رفض اقتراح حامل البريد بختم الكيس  
الذي لوحظ سقوط رصاصته وظل مصرا على فتح الكيس لصرفة محتويات الشنطة التي بداخله  
ولما امرته الحيلة اخذ حامل البريد من يده الى غرفة مجاورة وبدأ يطلب اليه ان يطلعه  
بصورة سرية على محتويات الشنطة التي يتضمنها الكيس وسأله عن محتويات الكيس الآخر  
وأجاب لير حبه ايضا .

٣- ان جمرك البصرة صادر الكيس الذي جاء به الموظف عبد الرحمن الطاع  
من جمرك الزبير ولم يلم بختمه وارسله كل هذه المدة الى جمرك بغداد ولا للمفوضية  
حسبما كان افهم به حامل البريد ولم يخط به مستندا رسميا وكلما تمكن حامل البريد من  
الحصول عليه بعد الألتاح الشديد هو قصاصة من الورق تحمل توقيع احد مأموري الجمرك  
في البصرة بتاريخ ٢٧ / ١ / ١٩٤٢ يشهد فيها بأنه استلم شنطة مقلولة تعود الى المفوضية  
المصرية السودانية في بغداد وانها كانت صحيحة حامل البريد السياسي السوداني وهذا  
المستند مرفق من طيه للأطلاع .

تعتبر المفوضية هذه المعاملة مخلة بشرف حكومتها ومناخية للقواعد الدولية لأن كيس  
البريد المذكور قد صدر من شخص له صفة حامل البريد السياسي الرسمي وكان في وسع  
السلطات المراقبة المختصة اذا اشتبهت في شيء ان تغير عنه المفوضية دون ان تلجأ  
الى هذه المعاملة كما ان حجز الكيس الى الآن يرغم اخبار المفوضية للوزارة المحترمة  
خطيا وشفويا بالحادث فور وقوعه لئلا يدعو الى الدهشة .



ان المفوضية لا يسمعها غير تقديم احتجاجها الشديد للوزارة المحترمة على هذه الحاملة الشاذة وبلاغها بأنه اذا لم تسلم الشنطة للمفوضية عاجلاً مع التأكيد بعدم تكرار هذا الحادث ومجازاة المسؤول عنه فان التدابير اللازمة ستتخذ فوراً لأيقاف سير الجهد بين الملادين .  
تتهدد المفوضية هذه الفرصة للأعراب عن فائق تقديرها واحترامها .

وزارة الخارجية العراقية

بغداد -



522/41

Saudi - Iraqi Relations 3801142  
**TELEGRAM.**

How received :

Parap

From : Mr. Stonehewer Bird To : H. M. AMBASSADOR,

JEDDA.

BAGDAD.

Copies to :

Despatched : 7.2.42. 15.30 hrs

Received : 9.2.42. 08.00 hrs

Decyphered : 9.2.42. 10.05 hrs

1 spare.

No. 19

of 7.2.42.

Addressed to BAGDAD TEL NO.19

repeated to Foreign Office No.63.

+ 1 chge

Ibn Saud has informed me that his Charge d'Affaires at Bagdad has been instructed to approach the +(customs, revenue) regarding the detention of a Saudi Arabian diplomatic bag by Basra customs authorities.

From the message he sent me it is clear that he is incensed to the point of threatening to sever relations with Iraq if he does not receive a satisfactory apology.

CB/GDM  
MWR  
RK